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Introduction
This statement is intended to provide an historical context for the events 
cited in the indictment.  It uses the watershed period of 1990-91 as an organ-
izing principle, a dividing line from which to consider the developments 
before those years and to discuss major trends since that time.
The statement is divided into five sections.  Section I gives the author’s per-
sonal background.   Section II is a “snapshot in time” of 1990-91, a profile of 
the way things were before large-scale violence began in the spring of 1992. 
It provides an overview of the former Yugoslavia just prior to its collapse. 
Section III concerns the widely held but essentially erroneous view that the 
region’s recent wars are a product of “ancient tribal hatreds.” Section IV is a 
survey of historical developments over the centuries prior to 1990.  Section V 
examines major developments from 1990 until the spring of 1993.
I. Personal Background
I am presently a Research Associate at the Russian and East European 
Center of the University of Michigan.  
After graduating from high school in my hometown of Kalamazoo, 
Michigan, I attended Hope College in Holland, Michigan.  In 1965 I par-
ticipated in a six-month seminar, travel, and independent study program 
sponsored by the Great Lakes Colleges Association, in Ljubljana, Slovenia. 
Since my family has no ethnic ties to the former Yugoslavia, this was my first 
experience in the region and drew my interest to the area for further study 
and travel.
Following completion of my military service, I enrolled at the University 
of Michigan and completed a Ph.D. in History in 1976.  With the aid of a 
Fulbright-Hays fellowship, I conducted research in archives and libraries of 
the former Yugoslavia and in other European institutions during 1974-75, 
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particularly in the Archives of Bosnia and Hercegovina in Sarajevo.  My 
doctoral dissertation dealt with political movements of Bosniacs during the 
Austro-Hungarian period in Bosnia around beginning of the twentieth centu-
ry.  It was subsequently published in 1981 in the East European Monographs 
series (distributed by Columbia University Press) under the title Islam under 
the Double Eagle: The Muslims of Bosnia and Hercegovina, 1878-1914.
After completing my doctoral dissertation in 1976, I did post-graduate 
research for one year and then was engaged as an Assistant Professor of 
History, first at the Ohio State University Lima Campus (1978-80), then at the 
University of Oregon (1980-81).  In 1981 I accepted a position with Merrill 
Lynch, a financial services firm, for which I worked until August 1998.  My 
work at Merrill Lynch was unrelated to the Southeast European region, but I 
maintained an interest in the area and followed developments there.  In 1994, 
Professor John Fine (University of Michigan) and I wrote a book entitled 
Bosnia and Hercegovina:  A Tradition Betrayed (Columbia University Press).  I 
have also written a number of articles dealing with contemporary and histori-
cal developments in the region.   I am now preparing a book on the history of 
the city of Sarajevo in the twentieth century for publication by Hurst and Co. 
in London, England.  
Since 1993 I have made two or three trips a year to the region for periods 
from one to three weeks to consult with colleagues, conduct research and 
interviews, lecture, and gather various published materials.  I most recently 
visited the region in March 1999.
II. 1990-91:  A Time of Historical Transition
1990-91 was a watershed in the former Yugoslavia, a pivotal time of his-
torical transition.  During that time, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia 
dissolved, the first multi-party elections since World War II were held, and 
nationalist leaders were elected in all of the country’s six Republics.  These 
developments set the stage for subsequent independence by several republics 
and the wars in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, and (in the past 
year) Kosovo/Kosova.  A decennial census was taken in 1991.    Coupled with 
the election returns from 1990, the census provides valuable information 
regarding the national, political, and social composition of the population of 
the various Yugoslav Republics.
The Yugoslav Republics in 1990
Yugoslavia consisted of six republics whose boundaries remained stable, 
with only minor adjustments, from 1945 to 1991.  To the northwest of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is the Socialist Republic of Slovenia, with a 
population almost exclusively of Slovene nationality.  Slovenia has no sig-
nificant minority population.  To the far southeast on the map is the Socialist 
Republic of Macedonia, proclaimed as the home of the Macedonian national-
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ity after World War II.  Macedonia has a substantial Albanian minority and 
some other minority groups.
Serbia, in the north central part of Yugoslavia, grew in its modern embodi-
ment from a rebellion of merchants, farmers and warriors in 1804.  It was 
first recognized internationally as an independent state in 1878, although it 
became de facto independent many years before that.  In 1945, two “autono-
mous regions, at that time called Kosovo-Metohija and Vojvodina, were 
attached to Serbia for administrative purposes.   Kosovo (called Kosova in its 
Albanian name) to the south had a population that was about 90% Albanian 
by nationality and about 10% Serb.  Vojvodina, to the north, had (and has) 
a majority Serbian population but a substantial minority of Hungarians.  In 
1990 the government of Serbian President Slobodan Milošević enacted con-
stitutional changes that stripped both provinces of their autonomy. 
To the south and west of Serbia, the Socialist Republic of Montenegro is 
a small, highly mountainous area inhabited mainly by those who think of 
themselves as Serbs, although their distinct history and local pride leads them 
at times to distinguish themselves from Serbs living in Serbia proper.  Like 
Serbia, Montenegro won international recognition as an independent state in 
1878, but it had proudly resisted outside domination for centuries before. 
The Socialist Republic of Croatia, with its distinctive curvature around 
Bosnia and Hercegovina, is a diverse entity that encompasses the rich agri-
cultural plains of Slavonia to the north and the region of Dalmatia, which 
borders the Adriatic Sea.  Its population in 1991 was principally Croatian but 
included a minority of 581,663 Serbs, about 12% of its inhabitants.  
The Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina lies in the middle of the 
former Yugoslavia.  The southern portion, known as Hercegovina, derives 
its name from a fifteenth century a local ruler who designated himself as 
“Herceg,” a South Slav variant of the German word “Herzog,” meaning “Duke.” 
(The Germanic origins of the term are evident in a frequent English-language 
rendering of the name as “Herzegovina,” restoring the “z.”)  
The name “Bosnia” is derived from the river of the same name, the “Bosna,” 
which spews forth from underground sources just west of the city of Sarajevo. 
It refers to the northern two-thirds of the Republic, but the term “Bosnia” 
is increasingly used as an abbreviation to avoid the clumsy “Bosnia and 
Hercegovina.”  Bosnia and Hercegovina have shared an administrative history 
since the Ottoman era, and in the late nineteenth century they were merged 
into a single political entity under Austro-Hungarian rule.  
The term “Bosnian” refers to inhabitants of Bosnia and Hercegovina. 
Within that broad designation, most Bosnians also identify themselves as 
belonging to one of three nationalities: Serb, Croat, or Bosnian Muslim. 
According to the 1991 census, the Republic had a total of 4,354,911 inhabit-
ants.  17.3% declared themselves Croats; 31.3% declared themselves Serbs; 
and 43.7% declared themselves Muslims. 
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Thus the most numerous nationality in 1990 was the Muslims, then called 
the “Bosnian Muslims,” or the “Muslims of Bosnia and Hercegovina.”  The 
term was not wholly satisfactory, as it suggested a religious identity when 
in fact many Bosnian Muslims were secularized or even atheists, and most 
Bosnian Muslims view themselves as members of a distinct nationality. 
On September 28, 1993, the Second Assembly of Bosnian Muslims met in 
Sarajevo and voted overwhelmingly to change the group’s name to “Bosniak,” 
or “Bošnjak” (plural “Bošnjaci”) in the local language.  This change has been 
universally adopted by the international community and by the vast majority 
of members of the group.  (In this statement, the terms “Bosniak” and “Bosnian 
Muslim” are used interchangeably as appropriate in their particular historical 
context.)  The words “Bosnian” and “Bosniak” are nearly identical but have 
very distinct meanings.  “Bosnian” refers to an inhabitant of the geographic 
area of Bosnia and Hercegovina, whereas the word “Bosniak” thus refers to a 
nationality (formerly known as the Bosnian Muslims), whose individuals are 
called “Bosniacs.”   
The two other major nationalities are the Serbian and Croatian, whose 
individuals are called Serbs and Croats.  Serbs are typically of the Serbian 
Orthodox faith, and Croats are typically Catholics.  There are, however, many 
non-religious Serbs and Croats.  Most of them nevertheless strongly iden-
tify with the religious heritage associated with their respective nationality. 
Inhabitants of Bosnia who are Serb or Croat by nationality are commonly 
called Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats.  One often finds them described 
simply as “Serb” or “Croat,” without the adjectival “Bosnian,” when it is obvious 
that the referent is an inhabitant of Bosnia and Hercegovina. 
Also noteworthy is a significant minority of Slavic Muslims who live in 
Serbia and Montenegro along the boundary between those two Republics. 
This area, known as the Sandžak of Novi Pazar or more simply the Sandžak, 
has a distinct history.  Its Muslim inhabitants primarily think of themselves as 
Bosniaks (formerly called the Bosnian Muslims) and have a recent political 
history similar to that of the much larger population of Bosniaks in nearby 
Bosnia and Hercegovina.   Some members of this group sought autonomy 
from Serbia and Montenegro in 1991, but without success. 
The 1991 Census
Results of the 1991 census show that the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims of 
Bosnia were intermingled through almost all the territory of that Republic. 
As of 1991, this was not a land easily divisible into ethnic enclaves by draw-
ing lines on a map.  Only in a few areas did one find a single group with a 
substantial majority.  A few northern areas, and a strip of land along Bosnia’s 
western border with Croatia, had a majority Serb population.  An enclave to 
the northwest of the city of Bihać was largely Muslim; and the area to the 
west of Mostar was nearly exclusively Croat.  But most of the Republic was a 
mixture of all three groups.  In the countryside, many villages were nationally 
homogenous, but one could often find a village of another nationality nearby. 
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There were a substantial number of nationally mixed villages, particularly in 
the region of central Bosnia in and around the Lašva Valley.
The cities were the most mixed parts of Bosnia and Hercegovina accord-
ing to the 1991 census.  The circles on Map Two represent the population 
of cities and major towns.  A few have a majority Muslim population, but 
most have a combination.   Mixed marriages were widespread in the cities 
by 1991.  Some urban residents of mixed origins, or in the desire to avoid any 
national orientation, declared themselves as “Yugoslavs” in the 1991 census. 
The category “Yugoslav or other” accounted for 7.7% of Bosnia’s population 
in 1991.                                                                                       
The southern region of Hercegovina had a distinctive national makeup.  To 
the west, it was nearly exclusively Croat.  Bosnian Muslims were present in 
most cities and throughout the central area.  In eastern Hercegovina, Bosnian 
Muslims had a strong presence that gradually gave way to an almost exclu-
sively Serbian population as one approached and then entered the highland 
territory of Montenegro.  
1990 Elections
In Bosnia multiparty elections were held in November 1990 and, as else-
where in Yugoslavia, nationalist leaders were victorious.  Thus most seats in 
the representative assembly were won by three major parties, one representing 
each of the three major ethnic groups.  The leading Bosniac party, named the 
Party of Democratic Action (or SDA, in its local language acronym), won 86 of 
the 240 seats.  The leading Serbian party, the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), 
won 72 seats; the leading Croatian party, the Croatian Democratic Union 
(HDZ), won 44 seats.  The remaining 38 seats were shared by eight different 
political groups.
The 1990 elections also brought to power, or confirmed in power, others 
who have remained as leaders of their countries since then.  In the Republic 
of Serbia, the 1990 elections left the Serbian President and former communist, 
Slobodan Milošević, in power.  In the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, 
a former Partisan and communist who was an historian by profession, was 
elected President as head of the Croatian Democratic Union on a nationalist 
platform.
The 1990 elections represented the defeat of the reformists, reformed com-
munists and socialists, who prevailed only in a few local areas.  Principal 
among them was the city of Tuzla in northeastern Bosnia.
The 1990 elections represent a pivotal time in the history of Bosnia and 
Hercegovina.  Developments prior to this time are significant in that they 
influenced both the claims and the conduct of political leaders who came to 
power in 1990. 
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III. The Myth of “Ancient Tribal Hatreds”
The easiest and most facile explanation for Bosnia’s history is also its most 
recent: the notion that all of its past is characterized by ancient tribal hatreds. 
According to this view, all South Slavs are animated by primordial mutual 
hatred.  They are all violence-prone, and animosity toward their neighbors 
is deeply imbedded in their souls and psyches. Therefore, in this view, the 
violence that characterized the region in World War II and during the wars 
of 1991 to 1995 was an inevitable recurrence of ethnically-motivated violence 
that predictably emanates from the primitive, hate-filled South Slavic soul.  
Certain western diplomats and journalists first expounded this view in the 
early 1990’s.  It met the needs of those diplomats who wanted to avoid any 
engagement in the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, and it filled the minds of jour-
nalists with the notion that their new subjects were exotic, primitive, colorful, 
unpredictable, and truly different from the average western “civilized” reader 
or viewer.  Thus there grew up a close association between an historical expla-
nation, the “ancient tribal hatreds” view, and those policy-makers in Europe, 
the U.S., and the international community who wished to avert their gaze 
from the conflict and who opposed significant outside involvement, particu-
larly military intervention, in the region.
I find little historical foundation for this viewpoint.  This is not to say that 
there has not been plenty of violence in the history of the region, but very little 
of it, until the twentieth century, can be characterized as between nationalities 
or ethnic groups.  Historians generally agree that the South Slavs lost their 
tribal character by the end of the medieval period at the latest, so to speak 
of “tribes” after about the 14th century is inappropriate.  Finally, national and 
ethnic conflict has typically been occasioned by and frequently instigated by, 
outsiders.  
IV. History from the Slavic Migrations to 1900
Migrations 
The peoples now known as the South Slavs migrated to Southeast Europe 
sometime in the 6th or 7th century A.D.  Their approximate homeland prior to 
migrating was in the area of present-day northwestern Ukraine, southwestern 
Belarus and eastern Poland.  Scholars disagree substantially concerning the 
probable area of origin for these migrations.  However, there is substantial 
agreement that the South Slavs migrated as tribes.  Unlike the Huns, the 
Visigoths, the Avars, and later the Mongols, the peoples now called the South 
Slavs were sedentary.  Once they reached the Balkan Peninsula, they settled 
down.  They continue to constitute the majority of the population in this 
region to the present day.  
Upon reaching Southeast Europe, the South Slavs settled in an area between 
the two major centers of Christianity in Rome and Constantinople. These rival 
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centers remained part of one church until the Great Schism of 1054, but their 
influences were quite different.   The South Slavs were Christianized from 
the west by Catholics and from the east by Orthodox missionaries. Cyril and 
Methodius, who visited the area in 863-864 from Constantinople, are credited 
with developing the basis for the Glagolitic script for Slavic languages. Catholic 
missionaries and orders under the Pope’s direction were active throughout the 
region from the middle ages onward.  Consequently one cannot draw a divid-
ing line between the eastern and western versions of the Christian religion 
in southeast Europe.  Rather, they overlapped, intermingled, and competed 
with one another for many centuries up to the present day.  Nevertheless, as a 
broad generalization, these rival influences led to the prevalence of Orthodox 
Christianity in the eastern South Slav regions and Roman Catholicism in the 
western lands.
Medieval Kingdoms
Starting in about the ninth century, medieval kingdoms emerged under 
Slavic rulers.  While there were others, I will address only the three that had 
substantial holdings in the area of Bosnia and Hercegovina: the Serbian, 
Croatian, and Bosnian medieval states. They arose in a challenging inter-
national environment.  A number of rival empires and kingdoms were con-
tending for hegemony in the region: the Byzantine Empire with its capital 
in Constantinople, the Franks in western Europe, and later Venice along the 
Adriatic Sea and the Hungarian Kingdom to the north.  (The Hungarians 
arrived in their present homeland in 996).  The medieval states of southeast 
Europe were frequently vassals, to a greater or lesser degree, to one of their 
neighbors.
Regrettably, we know relatively little about these medieval kingdoms.  Most 
evidence comes from outsiders, reports written for the rulers of neighboring 
realms, missionary reports, royal charters, and some archeological and lin-
guistic evidence.  In the most general sense, their princes and kings began as 
leaders of tribes or tribal confederations who succeeded through war, guile, or 
marriage in carving out some privileges for their own entities.  They enhanced 
their power through raising armed retinues, collecting taxes, conquest, coin-
age, and acquiring elevated titles such as “Ban” (Governor), Duke, King, 
Emperor, and (post mortem) saint.  Particularly in the case of the Serbian 
Kingdom, they acquired prestige and popularity by endowing churches and 
monasteries.  These states were dependent upon the abilities and success of a 
single ruler or succession of rulers.  Those rulers, in turn, were dependent on 
their ability to control vassals, to extract taxes, and to defend territory.  Often 
their control of people was tenuous and their domination of territory was 
transient.
Our lack of knowledge has left the door open to contending claims by 
nationalists in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries who want to restore 
perceived ancient grandeur. National popularizers have frequently attributed 
to these kingdoms a splendor they did not possess and done so with greater 
R.J.DONIA, Statement of Expert Witness                                                                                     God. 36., br. 1., 107.-141. (2004) 
114 115
certainty than the factual record can sustain.  Nevertheless, the Croatian, 
Serbian, and Bosnian medieval kingdoms each held sway over much of the 
region for many years, creating a large area in the South Slav lands that is cov-
eted by multiple claimants.
The kingdom of Croatia originally emerged from a group of South Slavic 
tribal leaders who were vassals of the Franks. After the death of Charlemagne 
in 814 they increasingly asserted their independence.  Vladislav, whose rule 
began in 821, was the first of these leaders to style himself as a Duke of the 
Croatians and Dalmatians. The kingdom was based, and enjoyed its great-
est control, in the central and northern Dalmatian coast.  The zenith of 
the Croatian Kingdom was reached under King Tomislav, who ruled from 
approximately 910 until about 920 or 925. He was crowned King of Croatia 
with the permission of the Pope.  His conquests probably included most of 
present-day Bosnia.  King Tomislav has become a significant icon in Croatian 
national history:  a monumental statue of Tomislav greets today’s visitor to 
Zagreb upon walking out of the main railroad station.
Subsequent rulers lost and then regained much of the territory over which 
Tomislav ruled. The King appointed Bans (governors) to rule over various 
areas, including Pannonia, Dalmatia and Bosnia. The Croatian kingdom expe-
rienced difficult times late in the 11th century after the holder of the Crown 
died.  For about ten years there were conflicts over who would occupy the 
throne.  In 1102 a group of Croatian nobles met with the King of Hungary 
and asked him to add Croatia to the holdings of the Hungarian Crown. 
This agreement is enshrined in a document called the Pacta Conventa. Most 
Croatian historians portray this as a voluntary submission, while Hungarian 
historians tend to portray it more as the result of a conquest.  But the greater 
significance of the Pacta Conventa lay in its longevity. From 1102 until the end 
of World War I in 1918, the King of Hungary was also the King of Croatia. 
This provides Croatia with a claim to juridical continuity over that eight-cen-
tury period, although through much of that time Croatia was subjected to a 
greater or lesser degree of Hungarian domination.
The medieval Serbian Empire began in the southeastern area of lands inhab-
ited by South Slavs. In 1036, Stefan Vojislav began to consolidate the Serbian 
tribes in a small area adjacent to the Adriatic Sea,  In 1077, Constantine Bodin 
came to the throne and ruled as a Catholic.  Stefan Nemanja (ruled 1168-
1196) united the areas of Zeta, Raška, and Hum, thereby extending Serbian 
rule into the region of present-day eastern Hercegovina.  The ruler and his 
people gradually moved closer to Orthodox Christianity.  Stefan II, son and 
successor of Stefan Nemanja, was crowned first by a papal legate in 1217 and 
then by a representative of the Eastern Empire in 1222.  The medieval Serbian 
kingdom ended up as distinctly Orthodox in its religious character and in the 
cultural sphere of Constantinople. 
In the fourteenth century, the Serbian kingdom came into conflict with the 
Ottoman Empire, an Islamic state moving into the Balkan Peninsula from the 
east.  The Serbian Kingdom, along with allies from other European states, 
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fought the Ottomans at the Battle of Maritsa in 1371 and again at Kosovo 
Polje in 1389.   Serbian historians and popularizers often portray the Battle 
of Kosovo as a particularly tragic defeat that signaled the death of medieval 
Serbia, but many scholars tend to characterize it quite differently as a sig-
nificant but inconclusive battle.  The Serbian state survived for some dec-
ades after the battle, but Ottoman conquests were renewed after a period of 
withdrawal and consolidation.  When finally conquered by the Ottomans, the 
Serbian state ceased to exist.  At its height the Serbian Kingdom included large 
portions of present-day Greece, Albania, Croatia, and Bosnia, particularly that 
portion more properly called Hercegovina.
The medieval Bosnian state emerged from Hungarian domination in 
1180 under Ban (Governor) Kulin, although it remained nominally a vassal 
of Hungary through most of the Middle Ages.  It began as a small island of 
land that covered the region of present-day Sarajevo and extended to the west 
to include the Lašva Valley and Prozor areas of central Bosnia.  Kotromanić, 
a successor of Kulin, added more lands to the state by conquering much of 
the southern region from the Serbian Nemanje dynasty.  Tvrtko was crowned 
King of Bosnia and Serbia in 1377, and in 1390 he added Croatia and the 
coastal portion of Dalmatia to his crown.  His death in 1391 represented the 
high point of Bosnian state control, after which it experienced increasingly 
successful pressure from Hungary and the Ottoman Empire.  At the height of 
its power, the Bosnian state included large areas that are part of present-day 
Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro.
The medieval Bosnian state had a distinct religious history, although one 
must emphasize again how little is known about its specific religious char-
acter.  Hungary, to bolster its case for turning its campaign for conquering 
Bosnia into a crusade, accused the church leaders in Bosnia of harboring a 
dualist heresy called Bogomilism.  Churchmen in Bosnia subsequently broke 
with the Catholic Church and established their own independent organiza-
tion known as the Bosnian Church.  Outside Bosnia, many came to believe 
that the Bosnian Church was a haven for Bogomil heretics.  Recent scholar-
ship has strongly challenged the notion that Bogomilism held sway in medi-
eval Bosnia.  The Franciscan mission to Bosnia was established in the year 
1342 under the sponsorship of the Ban, and thereafter medieval Bosnia was 
increasingly influenced by western Catholicism. But for about a century, from 
1252 to 1342, the medieval Bosnian church, whatever doctrines and practices 
it may have followed, flourished in much of the state.
The medieval kingdoms of Southeast Europe all eventually succumbed 
to their stronger neighbors.  Croatia became part of the Hungarian Crown. 
Serbia and Bosnia were conquered by the Ottoman Empire, which later occu-
pied much of Hungary and Croatia as well.  From the fifteenth until the early 
twentieth century, most South Slavs were ruled by the Ottoman and Habsburg 
Empires and by the Republic of Venice.
The medieval period was therefore a time of religious rivalry between 
Orthodoxy and Catholicism and of territorial conquests that ebbed and 
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flowed with the rise and fall of the Croatian, Serbian, and Bosnian states.  At 
various times between about 900 and 1400, each of these three medieval states 
held sway over large territories that at different times were incorporated into 
one or both of the others.  In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, many 
Serbian and Croatian nationalists asserted claims based on the farthest extent 
of territory held by their respective medieval kingdoms.   They bolstered their 
arguments based on time of possession: The descendents of the first ones to 
rule, claimed to have superior territorial rights.  Other nationalist claims were 
based on the vaguer notion that spheres of religious or cultural influence pre-
vailed at one time or another in the medieval period.   The earliest states in the 
region were therefore claimed by multiple contenders in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, claims that were often plausible only because so little was 
known about the early states.  These claims generously overlap one another 
and frequently exaggerate the holdings and significance of their claimed pre-
decessors.  Taken together they are wholly irreconcilable. 
Imperial Rule: Ottoman and Habsburg
The Ottomans made initial forays into the Balkan Peninsula in the four-
teenth century and eventually conquered much of the region, even unsuccess-
fully laying siege to Vienna in 1526 and again in 1683.  The Ottoman Empire 
did not force large-scale conversions to Islam.  The South Slav population 
therefore remained predominantly Christian in most areas of Southeast 
Europe that came under Ottoman rule.  In Bosnia, however, people converted 
to Islam in significant numbers in the 140 years or so after the Ottomans con-
quered Bosnia in 1463. 
The extensive period of conversions to Islam, from 1463 until approxi-
mately 1600, was a time of relative fluidity in religious affiliation.  Based on the 
existing evidence, it is not possible to identify conclusively lines of continuity 
from any single previously existing group or religious community.  Various 
reports show that conversions took place in all directions without creating 
public controversy.  Thus Bosnia became a society of three primary religions: 
Islam, Serbian Orthodoxy, and Catholicism.  With the exodus of Jews from 
Spain after 1492, some Sephardic Jews moved to Bosnia, adding a fourth reli-
gion (albeit with relatively few adherents) to the area. 
Ottoman society was governed in part by the millet system.  Millets were 
not territories; rather, they were made up of people in all parts of the Empire 
with a particular religious affiliation.  Orthodox Christians enjoyed a lim-
ited amount of self-government through their millet, led by the Patriarch 
who resided under the Sultan’s close watch in Istanbul.  Jews and Armenians 
each had their own millet.  The Catholics, whose spiritual loyalty to the Pope 
was a source of suspicion to the Ottoman ruling class, enjoyed no such ben-
efit.  Catholics found themselves disadvantaged by a host of constraints that 
applied to non-Muslims, and they lacked the institutional protection that the 
millet system provided at times to others.  The number of missions of the 
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Franciscan Order dropped sharply under Ottoman rule, and few new Catholic 
churches were built.
In addition to these widespread conversions in Bosnia, Ottoman rule 
changed the demographic character of the region in two other important 
ways.  The first of these was politically induced migration.  As the Habsburg 
Empire sought to protect its borders against further Ottoman incursions and 
conquest, it established boundary zones to promote the growth of a warrior 
class.  It granted freedom of religion and property to those, mainly of the 
Serbian Orthodox faith, who would move there and take up arms when called 
upon.  The Ottoman Empire engaged in a similar practice and drew both 
Muslims and Serbian Orthodox to its side of the boundary, although typi-
cally under Muslim commanders.  Known as the Military Frontier, or “Vojna 
krajina” in the local Slavic language, this border zone resulted in a substantial 
Serbian Orthodox population in a wide swath of Croatia.  The descendants of 
these frontiersmen, and of other Serbs who had migrated there, would rebel 
against Croatian rule in 1990-91.  The military frontier on the Ottoman side 
of the border accounts in part for the concentration of Serbs in the north and 
west of Bosnia discussed earlier.
Finally, many population changes took place owing principally to economic 
and social change, primarily the prosperity and economic growth that came 
to the region in the first century and a half of Ottoman rule.  Cities grew up 
along trade routes, among them the city of Sarajevo, which like many other 
Bosnian cities in the 16th century had a population made up largely of Slavic 
Muslims who prospered on the city’s status as the capital and as a major center 
of trade and commerce.  Later under Ottoman rule, many Christians became 
kmets (a term often erroneously translated as “serf”), peasants who paid dues 
to Muslim landlords much like tenant farmers but held hereditary rights to 
the land they tilled.  This led to tensions between Christian peasants and the 
Bosnian Muslim landowners and eventually to peasant rebellions in the nine-
teenth and early twentieth century.
Map Seven shows the administrative units of the Ottoman Empire.  This 
shows that Bosnia, as we have come to know it on today’s maps as a large, 
triangular, inland area, was preserved as a series of administrative units in 
the Ottoman Empire.  It changed from its medieval predecessor in two ways. 
First, Bosnia lost its lands along the Adriatic Coast and became an inland ter-
ritory.  Second, lands in the northwest were added to Bosnia as the Ottomans 
conquered further territory in that region.  With these changes, Bosnia’s 
boundaries remained remarkably consistent from the Ottoman era until 1929. 
Although Bosnia lost its independence when the Ottomans conquered it in 
1463 and was not to become a sovereign state again until 1992, it continued 
as a distinct administrative unit, or small cluster of units, for four centuries. 
Among polities in Southeast Europe, Bosnia’s boundaries have been more sta-
ble and long-lasting than those of neighboring Croatia or Serbia.
The gradual decline of Ottoman authority and efficiency came to a crisis in 
1875, when Serbian Orthodox peasants arose in a rebellion in Bosnia.  Soon 
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several major powers became involved in regional wars, leading the Great 
Powers of Europe to convene the Congress of Berlin in 1878 to redraw the 
map of Southeast Europe.  As part of that realignment, Austria-Hungary was 
given a mandate to “occupy and administer” Bosnia.  Thirty years later, in 
1908, the Austria-Hungary formally annexed Bosnia, but in fact it took full 
military and administrative control starting in 1878.      
The Austro-Hungarian period in Bosnia lasted from 1878 to 1918.  It ush-
ered in an area of modernization, a centralized bureaucracy, the first serious 
development of a transportation and communication infrastructure, and 
considerable industrialization.  Despite this serious attempt to modernize 
Bosnia, the authorities retained the system whereby kmets (who were nearly 
all Christians) paid dues to landlords (who were almost all Muslims), thereby 
failing to resolve a major grievance of the largely Christian peasantry.  This 
decision favored the Bosnian Muslim landowning elite.  On the other hand, 
the Catholic population increased under Austro-Hungarian rule.  The Dual 
Monarchy sent many Catholics to Bosnia as administrators, some of them 
from the Croatian lands.  A regular Catholic church hierarchy was established 
in 1881 and soon acquired considerable political influence in Bosnia.  
The first modern, large-scale political parties also date from this time. 
They reflected the development of nationalism in the prior half-century. 
Nationalism was introduced into Bosnia from the outside, but it found fer-
tile soil during the latter half of the nineteenth century in the Catholic and 
Serbian Orthodox religious communities which had developed distinct iden-
tities by then.  In a process often described as a “national awakening,” Serbs 
and Croats developed greater awareness of their national histories and sought 
greater autonomy or independence for their nation-states.  This process was 
well advanced in Croatia and Serbia before it evoked major echoes in Bosnia, 
notwithstanding a few Bosnian intellectuals and churchmen who came to 
advocate it wholeheartedly. 
Within Bosnia, this process can be seen as the culmination of a process that 
began with the formation of religious communities, the evolution of related 
cultural traits, and finally their development into ethnic or national groups. 
As noted earlier, religious conversions took place with relative ease in the first 
years of Ottoman rule, but thereafter the adherents of each religion developed 
distinctive cultural traits and practices, some of which were unrelated to reli-
gion per se.  Catholics, Orthodox, and Muslims thus differentiated themselves 
on the basis of the holidays they honored, their cuisine, attire (especially head-
wear), oral traditions, songs, and the appearance of their houses.  These cul-
tural traits and practices eventually became the markers of religious commu-
nities and then of national affiliation.  Identification by nationality co-existed 
for many individuals with local, regional, religious, and social identities, and 
even in this century it never fully supplanted them.
Keys to these developments were religious institutions: the Serbian 
Orthodox Church, the Franciscan missions, Muslim religious leaders, teach-
ers, and judges, and their related institutions of learning.  By the middle of 
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the nineteenth century, one’s membership in a religious and cultural com-
munity also began to signify identification in a national community, one that 
had political significance.  Members of the Serbian Orthodox faith came to 
identify themselves politically as Serbs, Catholics came to identify themselves 
politically as Croats, and Muslims also became more distinctive and came 
together for political action.  Around the beginning of the twentieth century, 
both the Serbs of Bosnia and the Bosnian Muslims organized movements 
for cultural autonomy that succeeded after extensive negotiations with the 
Austro-Hungarian authorities.   These movements became the basis for politi-
cal parties formed along national lines.   Under clerical leadership, Bosnian 
Catholics also became politically engaged and organized political parties after 
the turn of the century.
Following Austria-Hungary’s formal annexation of Bosnia in 1908, it prom-
ulgated a constitution and held elections for delegates to an assembly (Sabor). 
Voting was based on a very limited franchise and employed the curial system 
then in use in Austria-Hungary, which assigned voters to specific religious 
and social categories within which they could vote.  Nevertheless, the win-
ners of these elections were aligned much like the victors of the 1990 elec-
tions some eighty years later.   The Serbian National Organization prevailed 
among Serbian voters, and the Muslim National Organization won most seats 
among the Bosnian Muslim parties.  The Croatian parties split along two 
lines, one following the secular and national “Croatian National Union,” and 
the other adopting a religious, Catholic orientation, the “Croatian Catholic 
Association.”
Within the political alignment, the Bosnian Muslims were distinctly sepa-
rate.  They opposed agrarian reform (so that the landowners could retain 
their dues), sought to preserve and strengthen their religious and cultural 
autonomy, and supported a conservative social agenda.  Unlike the Serbs and 
Croats, however, the Bosnian Muslims continued to insist that they constitut-
ed a religious, not a national, community.  It became fashionable for educated 
Muslims and political activists to “declare” themselves to be of the Serbian or 
Croatian nationality.   Such Muslim “declarations” as Serbs and Croats consti-
tuted a unique form of political identity. It was limited primarily to educated 
and activist Muslims and proved to be both superficial and transient.  Some 
Muslims changed their national “declaration” at times during their public 
careers while others retained it for life.  Most significantly, it had little impact 
on behavior, as few “declared” Muslims left Muslim political parties or cultural 
societies to join Serbian or Croatian ones.  
It was common for a Muslim political organization to include some Muslims 
who declared themselves as Serbs and others who declared themselves as 
Croats.  The Muslim delegation elected to the “Constituent Assembly,” the 
body that drew up the Constitution for the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and 
Slovenes in 1920, was made up of 24 delegates, all members of the Yugoslav 
Muslim Organization (JMO).  By national “declaration,” they were mixed.  13 
delegates declared themselves as Croats, 5 as Serbs, 4 as “undeclared,” one as 
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“Yugoslav” and one as “Bosniac.”  None of these declarations had much influ-
ence on political behavior, and the delegates behaved and voted principally as 
members of their Muslim political party, the JMO.
Such “declarations” by Muslims had a more significant impact on their Serb 
and Croat counterparts.  Some Serbs and some Croats came became con-
vinced that the Muslims would eventually come around to their camp: they 
believed that if you scratched a Muslim, you would find underneath either a 
Croat or a Serb whose ancestors had converted to Islam.  Certain national-
ists harbored the belief that Bosnia was really a Serb-majority land (achieved 
by combining the number of Serbs and Muslims) or a Croat-majority land 
(achieved by combining the number of Croats and Muslims).  This conclusion 
was only possible if one contended that the Bosniacs (Bosnian Muslims) were 
in fact something other than what they said they were.  One such nationalist 
was Dr. Franjo Tudjman, the historian elected President of Croatia in 1990, 
who believed the vast majority of Bosnia’s Muslims were Croats.   
Not until the census results of the socialist period did it become clear that 
these nationalist beliefs were based more on wishful thinking than empirical 
evidence.  The census returns show that the vast majority of Muslims rejected 
the Serbian or Croatian identity and truly regarded themselves as part of a dis-
tinct Bosnian Muslim nationality.  Thus the Bosnian Muslim identity proved 
to be the underlying, enduring one.  The declarations of many members of 
the Bosnian Muslim elites as Serbs or Croats, on the other hand, proved to be 
superficial and transient.  If you scratched a Bosnian Muslim who “declared” 
himself a Croat or a Serb, you still found a Bosnian Muslim underneath.
On June 28, 1914, the Habsburg Archduke Francis Ferdinand was assas-
sinated in Sarajevo by a group of young Serbian nationalists belonging to an 
amorphous organization known as “Young Bosnia.”  This did not “cause” World 
War I, as popularizers often assert, but it set in motion a complex chain of events 
that ultimately led Germany to invade France through Belgium and Austria-
Hungary to attack Serbia, each some six weeks or more after the assassination. 
Although at one point Serbian guns approached Sarajevo, the Serbian forces 
were soon driven from Bosnian territory, and relatively little combat subse-
quently took place on Bosnian soil.  Many Bosnians, however, were engaged 
in the war as soldiers, fighting either for Austria-Hungary or as volunteers for 
Serbia.  Serbia itself was the scene of numerous battles.  The Serbian army fought 
valiantly in World War I.  Although it experienced great losses, it emerged victo-
rious along with other allied armies against the Central Powers.
As the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy collapsed and the war came to an 
end, Serbia was in the best position to lead the process of creating a South 
Slav state. It was an independent state, it had its own army that had emerged 
triumphant against the Central Powers, and its ruling dynasty was in a strong 
position to unite the South Slavs.
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The First Yugoslavia and World War II
On December 1, 1918, Crown Prince Aleksandar of the Serbian 
Karadjordjević Dynasty proclaimed the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and 
Slovenes.  From the outset, the Kingdom, informally called Yugoslavia (the 
Land of the South Slavs), embodied different aspirations for those who helped 
create it.  For the Serbs, it meant the realization of their long-standing aspira-
tion to create a centralized, Serbian state, a union of “blood brothers” in which 
the Karadjordjević Dynasty would provide the leadership, the Serbian Army 
would contribute its military prowess, and Serbian officials would provide 
administrative leadership and stability.  The Croats and Slovenes, on the other 
hand, were under considerable duress to join the Kingdom because Italian 
forces were threatening to seize significant portions of their lands.  They saw 
in the Kingdom the possibility of a confederation in which they might achieve 
parity with the Serbs.  
The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was largely an amalgam of 
its pre-war constituent parts.  Dalmatia was united with the former “Kingdom 
of Croatia and Slavonia” to create the Croatian component of the state, follow-
ing boundaries similar to those entities before World War I.   Bosnia retained 
its distinctive triangular shape with the rough-edged boundary to the east, fol-
lowing the meandering Drina River.  
The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes soon suffered from 
severe differences concerning its internal composition and the relationship 
between its nationalities.  On June 20, 1928, a Montenegrin assassin shot 
the leader of the largest Croatian party, Stjepan Radić, in Parliament.  Radić 
died some weeks later, leaving the Kingdom in turmoil.  On January 6, 1929, 
King Aleksandar suspended the existing Constitution and proclaimed a royal 
dictatorship. He banned parties based on nationalities and extended the exist-
ing ban on the Communist Party.  Old internal boundaries were eliminated 
and new ones drawn that deliberately transected nationality patterns.  They 
were called “Banovinas,” a revival of the medieval word for governor (Ban) in 
a form referring to a territory.  Banovinas were named after natural features 
(principally rivers) rather than nationalities or prior administrative units. 
In this realignment, Bosnia lost its distinctive triangular-shaped boundaries 
for the first time since the Middle Ages.  As a final step to eliminate national 
designations from public life, Aleksandar changed the name of the state to the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia.
In October 1934, King Aleksandar was assassinated while in Marseilles, 
France.  The assassination was plotted by a group of Croatian Ustashe (“insur-
rectionists”), who wanted Croatia to be independent of Yugoslavia, and carried 
out with the help of Macedonian terrorists. In 1939 his successor, Prince Paul, 
authorized his Prime Minister, Cvetković, to pursue an agreement with Vladko 
Maček, the head of the Croatian Peasant Party.  
The Cvetković-Maček negotiations lasted some months.   They constituted 
a desperate effort to satisfy Croatian aspirations within the framework of 
Yugoslavia, conducted under duress in the shadow of German pressure and 
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Italian threats to support Croatian secession.  The final agreement, reached 
in August 1939, met most of the demands of the two largest national actors 
in Yugoslavia – the Serbs and the Croats – at the expense of the smaller ones, 
largely with the addition of Bosnian territory to historically Croatian lands. 
The agreement goes by various names: the Cvetković-Maček Agreement, the 
Sporazum (the local language word for “Agreement”), or the Banovina Plan. 
The agreement created a large Croatian Banovina.  As such it abandoned the 
notion of the Banovina as a non-national entity, instead creating an explicitly 
Croatian national banovina with certain rights of autonomy.  It also specified 
that plebiscites would be held in certain areas to determine which Banovina 
they would belong.  Those plebiscites were never held. 
 The Banovina Plan was in effect for less than two years, from August 1939 
until April 1941.  As a fulfillment of Croatian territorial ambitions, it has fre-
quently been a source of nostalgia for Croatian nationalists of post World War 
II era.  Lord David Owen, the negotiator for the European Union in peace 
talks in 1992 and 1993, made the following observation:
 Because the 1939 Cvetković-Maček agreement had given the Croatian 
nation control over substantial parts of Bosnia-Hercegovina, many 
Croats, not least Franjo Tudjman, never in their hearts accepted the 
1945 boundary between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.1
Despite the agreement, political turmoil continued to plague Royal 
Yugoslavia.  Angered by Yugoslavia’s reluctance to adhere to the Tripartite 
Pact, Hitler initiated an invasion of Yugoslavia.  On April 6, 1941, the Germans 
bombed Belgrade, killing many and bringing destruction to the city.  With 
little resistance from the Yugoslav Royal Army, Germany and Italy soon occu-
pied the country.  German troops occupied the north and east of the country, 
while Italian forces occupied the south and west, divided by a demarcation line 
that ran through the center of Bosnia.  The Croatian Ustashe, the right-wing 
group that planned and helped carry out the assassination of King Aleksandar 
in 1934, was given control over the so-called “Independent State of Croatia,” 
a territory encompassing the historical lands of the Croatian Kingdom and 
Bosnia.
The Ustashe regime came to power with some degree of popularity with 
the Croatian population, for it achieved in principle many far-reaching 
Croatian national aspirations.  It soon lost its initial popularity.  In the Rome 
Agreement of 1941, the Ustashe regime consented to Italy’s annexation of 
part of the Dalmatian Coast, thereby giving up a piece of territory that had 
been the heart of the old Dalmatian Kingdom.  The regime’s brutality further 
reduced popular support.  It systematically exterminated most of the Jews in 
its territories, and it aimed to eliminate the Serbian population through kill-
ings, conversions to Catholicism, and expulsions.  Many killings took place at 
the infamous camp at Jasenovac.  Tens of thousands perished there, including 
1 David OWEN, Balkan Odyssey, 20.
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Jews, Serbs, Gypsies, and Croats who were deemed to be opponents of the 
regime.
The Ustashe puppet regime took a different approach to the Muslims in 
its territory.  Reverting to the old nationalist belief that Muslims were really 
Croats who had converted to Islam, the Ustashe attempted to co-opt them 
into its regime.  An existing building in Zagreb was turned into a mosque, 
and officials promoted the notion that Muslims were good Croats, and even 
called them the most pure Croats.  This yielded some success.  Several lead-
ing Muslims joined the regime, and a significant number of Bosnia’s Muslims 
collaborated with the Ustashe and the Germans during the war.  German 
occupiers established a special unit for Muslim troops, but it was plagued by 
problems from the beginning and was not a functioning unit by 1944.  On the 
other hand, many Bosnian Muslims joined the Partisan resistance movement 
or otherwise opposed the Ustashe regime. 
Shortly after the German and Italian occupation began, a determined resist-
ance movement was mounted under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito and the 
Communist Party of Yugoslavia.  This movement eventually won the support 
of the British, over the objections of the Royal Government in exile.  Its suc-
cess lay partly in its readiness to fight aggressively even after German forces 
retaliated for attacks by brutally killing Yugoslav civilians.  A vital part of the 
Partisan appeal was its rigorous insistence on the equality of all Yugoslav 
nations, embodied in its slogan “Brotherhood and Unity.”  For Bosnia, this 
policy was articulated in 25-26 November 1943, at the first session of the 
Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, as 
follows:
 Bosnia and Hercegovina is not Serbian, nor Croatian, nor Muslim; it is 
Serbian, AND Croatian, AND Muslim.  
Such a notion of Bosnia and Hercegovina as an integral land, indivisible 
but a home to all three major constituent nations, was the basis for wartime 
appeals, the postwar socialist order in Bosnia, and the approach of many 
political leaders in the post-socialist period.
Socialist Yugoslavia 
After having established control over much of the countryside in the latter 
years of the war, the Partisans emerged victorious with the assistance of west-
ern aid and armed support from Soviet forces.  Tito and the Communist Party 
of Yugoslavia soon established a single-party, highly centralized regime.  They 
were committed to Stalinist political principles, to nationalizing the means 
of production, and to the ideology of “Brotherhood and Unity.”  Tito took 
brutal measures against suspected collaborators and sympathizers in the final 
months of the war and the first months of peace.  
Socialist Yugoslavia’s internal boundaries in many instances respected his-
torical precedent and traditional practices.  The Socialist Republic of Bosnia 
and Hercegovina was established as one of six Republics with its familiar tri-
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angular shape.  The five other Republics each had a majority nationality, but 
each (with the exception of Slovenia) also had substantial numbers of national 
minorities within its boundaries.
In 1948 Tito and the Yugoslav Communist Party were expelled from the 
Communist Information Bureau (Cominform), an alliance of communist 
countries dominated by Stalin.  The expulsion was the culmination of a grow-
ing dispute between Tito and Stalin.  It led Tito and his closest associates 
to seek a path of socialist development that was different from the Stalinist 
model.  In the early 1950’s, Tito and the party leadership defined this sepa-
rate path as the domestic policy of workers’ self-management (in contrast to 
central state control of all enterprises) and international non-alignment. 
Workers’ self-management eventually led to decentralization of economic 
control, greater openness of Yugoslavia’s borders, and expanded personal free-
dom for Yugoslavia’s citizens.  A parallel political process led to gradual decen-
tralization of federal authority in favor of the various Republics in the 1960’s 
and 1970’s.  This meant that the Republics were competing with one another 
for the resources of the federal government. 
Bosnia was unique among the Republics in that it carried no national name 
and contained no nationality that commanded a demographic majority.  The 
leadership of the League of Communists of Bosnia, consisting of those from 
all three nationalities, contended with other Republics for federal investment 
dollars for infrastructure, factories, and other development projects.  One of 
its most notable successes was to win for Sarajevo the 1984 Winter Olympics, 
an undertaking that enhanced the world reputation and economic welfare of 
the city and the Republic. 
Decentralization and greater personal freedom also led to expressions of 
national ambition and discontent.  The League of Communists was the pri-
mary mechanism through which such expressions were limited or repressed. 
In 1966, the head of the federal secret police, Aleksandar Ranković, was forced 
out of his government post and resigned from the party after charges that 
he had abused his powers for Serbian nationalist ends.  In 1971, Croatian 
intellectuals and politicians aroused popular support for greater freedom in 
Croatia.  Known as the “Croatian Spring” by its supporters, this movement 
was suppressed by Tito and the Communist Party through purges, imprison-
ment, and other measures taken in the name of preserving single-party rule 
and socialist principles. 
A new constitution was promulgated in 1974.  Although it was amended 
several times, this document was Yugoslavia’s last constitution.  It enshrined 
in law a much greater role for the individual Republics and resulted in further 
weakening of federal authority.   The key central political institution was the 
“Presidency,” a collective body (often called the “collective Presidency”) which 
had members representing each republic and autonomous province.  
The Constitution made specific provisions for the transfer and periodic 
rotation of power after Tito’s death, which took place on May 4, 1980.  Under 
the Constitution, a “President of the Presidency” would be confirmed each 
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year from among representatives of the six Republics and two autonomous 
provinces, selected on the basis of a pre-determined rotation.  With institu-
tionalized decentralization and federal institutions crippled by diffused and 
transitory authority, the country was held together by two key institutions: the 
League of Communists and the Yugoslav National Army (JNA).  According 
to the 1974 constitution, the JNA was to defend the country against outside 
enemies, but it also had a unique internal role.  It was to uphold the socialist 
order and assure the unity of Yugoslavia as a country.  
In December 1987, Slobodan Milošević took over the League of 
Communists of the Republic of Serbia.  A former banker and long-time party 
functionary, Milošević shortly thereafter began to manipulate Serbian nation-
alism to enhance his own power in neighboring areas.  In carefully staged 
actions, he employed massive street demonstrations to force the resignation of 
leaders in the autonomous regions of Vojvodina and Kosovo and the Republic 
of Montenegro.  Between 1988 and 1990, Milošević appointed his own follow-
ers in each of these areas and abolished the autonomy previously accorded to 
the Vojvodina and Kosovo.  In resorting to street demonstrations and forcing 
resignations, Milošević went outside previous practices of resolving differ-
ences within the League of Communists or representative assemblies.
In the late 1980’s, Yugoslavia was simultaneously heading down the roads 
of democratization and nationalist revival.  Both factors contributed to 
the demise of the League of Communists at its Fourteenth Extraordinary 
Congress in January 1990.  After the Slovene delegates walked out and the 
Croatian delegation refused to continue without them, the Congress was 
adjourned indefinitely.  This left the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) as the 
only meaningful institution holding the country together.  The JNA was 
transformed into a tool of Greater Serbian nationalist ambitions, setting the 
stage for armed conflict with those who rejected such aims.  With nation-wide 
elections scheduled for 1990 in which multiple parties could compete, there 
appeared to be some prospect for a popular resolution to the deep divisions 
plaguing Yugoslavia.  But those elections were never held.  Instead, electoral 
contests in each Republic served as a centripetal force: each enhanced the 
likelihood of nationalist victories and made Republican autonomy or inde-
pendence a more probable outcome.
Within Bosnia, these same trends were played out with local variations.  A 
series of scandals discredited the aging revolutionary-era party leadership. 
The first of these reminds one of an American junk bond scandal.  In August 
1987, press reports charged that Agrokomerc, a large food-producing enter-
prise in northwestern Bosnia, was issuing unsecured promissory notes. The 
founder and Executive Director, Fikret Abdić, was arrested, jailed, but never 
convicted of a specific crime.  In April 1988 it was revealed that Bosnian party 
leaders were using public funds to build luxury villas in Neum, the one small 
outlet that Bosnia had on the Adriatic Coast.  
This and other charges progressively weakened the hold of the old elite 
on power within the Bosnian League of Communists.  In April 1989 the 
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Bosnian Republican Assembly adopted constitutional amendments providing 
for democratic elections, a market economy, and limiting the powers of the 
Bosnian Presidency.  Thus Bosnia followed the pattern of other Republics, 
and indeed many countries of the region: its own assembly effectively voted 
itself into an era of democracy.  Power-holders voted to expose themselves to 
democratic elections under popular pressure and the rising discontent with 
traditional and more closed styles of leadership.  Those elections in November 
1990 brought a new set of leaders to the fore in Bosnia and in most other 
Republics of Yugoslavia.
V.  Developments of the Early 1990’s
The elections of 1990 transformed the political landscape of Bosnia and of 
most of the former Yugoslavia, with the significant exception of the Serbian 
Republic and its formerly autonomous regions.  In examining the post-elec-
toral developments, I will present a more analytical approach with the hope of 
outlining the major relevant trends in the early 1990’s.  These are:
1. The Greater Serbian alliance and its role in Slovenia, Croatia, and 
Bosnia;
2. The strengthening of the military forces of Croatia and Bosnia;
3. The involvement of the international community in the lands of the 
former Yugoslavia, particularly in Bosnia; and 
4. The transformation of the Croatian Democratic Union political party 
in Bosnia.
5. The convergence of all these developments in 1993 as a background for 
developments in central Bosnia.
The Greater Serbian Coalition: Its Deeds and their Consequences
Serbs were to be found in substantial numbers in four of Socialist 
Yugoslavia’s six Republics:  Serbia (and in both of its autonomous provinces, 
Vojvodina and Kosovo), Montenegro, Croatia, and Bosnia.  None of these was 
purely Serbian, and the Serbian populations were not geographically contigu-
ous.  When Slobodan Milošević came to power in Serbia in December 1987, 
he began to build a Greater Serbian alliance by supporting and fomenting 
Serbian nationalist movements in other republics.  The grand prize in his 
quest was the Yugoslav National Army (in its local language acronym, JNA), 
which he gradually transformed from a guardian of Yugoslav unity into a 
servant of Greater Serbian ambitions.
As already noted, the first steps in building this coalition were the purges 
of old-line League of Communist leaders in Montenegro, Vojvodina, and 
Kosovo in 1988 and 1989.  These resignations were forced by street demon-
strations, orchestrated from Belgrade to last as long as necessary to force out 
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the incumbents.  In their places, reliable servants of Milošević were appointed. 
In this way, the Serbian President came to control four of the eight votes in the 
Federal Presidency by 1990 and was able to paralyze much of its work.
The next to join this alliance were the leaders of the Serbs living in Croatia, 
many of whom were descendants of those who moved there centuries before 
to the Military Frontier (“Vojna krajina”) of the Habsburg and Ottoman 
Empires.  The 1991 census shows that just under 600,000 Serbs lived in Croatia 
at that time.  In 1990 and 1991, some of them received arms and encourage-
ment from certain officers of the Yugoslav National Army who supported 
Milošević’s nationalist aims.  General Ratko Mladić was one such commander. 
Before long, the Serbs of Croatia were restive and well armed, believing with 
good reason that the JNA would back them in an armed showdown with 
the Croatian police and territorial forces.  At the same time, Milošević sup-
ported the leader of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) in Bosnia, Radovan 
Karadžić.  That party won 72 seats in the Bosnian Assembly elections of 1990, 
and two of its leaders, Biljana Plavšić and Nikola Koljević, assumed the two 
Serbian seats in the collective Presidency of Bosnia and Hercegovina.  
In May 1991, the Republics of Slovenia and Croatia issued declarations of 
independence.  The JNA attempted to intervene in Slovenia to prevent that 
Republic’s independence, but it met surprisingly effective resistance.  Slovene 
territorial forces took control of their border posts and some key military sites. 
After representatives of the European Community intervened to mediate, the 
JNA ceased to contest Slovenia’s independence.  Slovenia, the most ethnically 
homogenous of the Yugoslav Republics, had no meaningful Serbian popula-
tion, so Serbian nationalists had little interest in pursuing territorial claims 
there.  An agreement was reached and the JNA withdrew, leaving Slovenia free 
to pursue its independence.
The fate of Croatia was to be different.  The Croatian Republic had not 
only a sizeable Serbian population but also substantial strategic importance 
to the JNA.  Provocative incidents increased in the summer of 1991.  Croatian 
officials, for their part, did little to provide assurance to Serbs of parity within 
the Croatian Republic.  In August 1991 the conflict erupted into full-scale war. 
Irregulars backed the local Serbs and the JNA in fighting against the Croatian 
military forces.  The city of Vukovar in Eastern Slovenia, defended by a small 
number of Croatian troops, was besieged for weeks and reduced to ruins by 
JNA artillery fire.  The city was taken by the JNA on November 17, 1991 and 
its defenders tried to evacuate the city.  Hundreds of civilians disappeared, 
their bodies later to be found in mass graves near the town.  Ethnic cleans-
ing, largely conducted by Serbian irregulars, made its ugly appearance in the 
Croatian war before it was practiced in Bosnia.
On January 2, 1992, a cease-fire was signed in Sarajevo between Croatia 
and the JNA to end hostilities.  The agreement provided for the deployment 
of a lightly armed UN peacekeeping force to separate the combatants.  For 
over three years, albeit with numerous exceptions, this tenuous cease-fire held. 
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Croatia, in the meantime, worked vigorously to build up its military forces to 
match or exceed those of the JNA.
The JNA increased its activities in Bosnia during the conflict in Croatia 
and freely used Bosnian territory as a staging area to support its war effort 
in Croatia.  The increasingly Serbian-oriented JNA relocated large stocks 
of military equipment and personnel to Bosnia as a result of the Croatian 
war.  By September 1991, several Serbian autonomous regions had already 
been established in Bosnia, using as a pretext the appeal of local Serbs for 
the protection of the JNA.  As requested by the European Community, a ref-
erendum on Bosnia’s independence was held on February 29 and March 1, 
1992.  Croats and Bosnian Muslims voted en masse for independence; Serbs 
boycotted the vote after being urged to do so by their nationalist leaders in the 
Bosnian Assembly.   As hostile incidents increased, the U.S. and the European 
Community announced their intention to recognize Bosnia’s independence. 
The day of the EC’s recognition, April 6, was also the first day of large-scale 
conflict in Bosnia.
The war in Bosnia was initiated and pursued in closely coordinated 
actions by the JNA, local Serbian irregulars, and paramilitaries including the 
Šešeljovci and Arkanovci.  A series of towns in Eastern Bosnia were the first to 
fall.   While the specific role of each of these coalition partners may be in ques-
tion until further evidence is evaluated, the consequences of their cooperation 
were largely the same.  Large numbers of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats 
were killed and their bodies buried in unmarked graves.  Those Muslims and 
Croats who escaped execution were expelled or imprisoned and rape was 
common.  In many cases, Serbian forces followed this violence against persons 
with the destruction of religious and cultural monuments associated with 
Islam, Catholicism, and the common life of Bosnia’s peoples.   
Not all localities in Eastern Bosnia were seized by the alliance of Serbian 
nationalist forces.  Srebrenica, Žepa, and Goražde were surrounded and 
besieged, but not overrun, in 1992.  Large guns were massed around Sarajevo 
by the JNA, then later by the Serb forces, in a siege that would last for almost 
four years.  Major Bosnian cities were flooded with refugees fleeing from these 
onslaughts, as was neighboring Croatia.  By the spring of 1993, the besieged 
cities came under periodic threat and attack from Serbian forces.  
Until March 1993, this coalition of Serbs from various republics and the 
JNA appeared to work.  The first cracks in its cohesion appeared in March 
1993, when the international community forcefully urged the Bosnian Serbs 
to sign the Vance-Owen Peace Plan (to be discussed below).  Yielding to this 
international pressure, Milošević joined in urging the Bosnian Serbs to sign. 
When they refused, he threatened to withhold aid and end cooperation.  Many 
observers, including this writer, believed at the time that this was a false indi-
cation.  But although aid continued to flow to the Bosnian Serbs, this fracture 
in relations between Milošević and at least some members of the Bosnian Serb 
leadership has continued ever since the spring of 1993.  The split in Serbian 
ranks at that time came as the first indication that Milošević’s support for 
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his coalition partners was conditional and subject to serious limitations.  In 
August of 1995, the Serbs of Croatia were overrun by Croatian military forces. 
Many Serbs from Croatia became refugees in Bosnia and Serbia.   If the deeds 
of the Serbian coalition profoundly disrupted the situation in Croatia and 
Bosnia, the coalition itself must also be judged as surprisingly fragile.
The Strengthening of the Croatian and Bosnian Military Forces
In January 1991, television viewers in most of Yugoslavia were shown 
scratchy videotape that pictured Croatia’s defense minister, Martin Špegelj, 
negotiating a purchase of arms from Hungary.  The tape was the work of 
undercover security officers of the JNA, who forced Špegelj’s resignation and 
departure from public life.  But the videotape provided documentary proof 
of the poorly kept secret that Croatia was desperately working to build up its 
inventory of arms and prepare its military forces for war, even as it remained 
within the Yugoslav Federation.
In socialist Yugoslavia, the territorial reserve forces were an integral part 
of the overall defense strategy.  In anticipation of possible invasion by foreign 
forces, the Yugoslav military was prepared to offer full local resistance to any 
occupier, and to that end the territorial forces, organized along Republican 
lines, were tasked with full preparedness.  However, they lacked heavy weap-
ons.  In the course of 1991, the Croatian army was created out of the territo-
rial forces built during the years of socialism.   Although Croatia suffered 
many setbacks in its war with the JNA in 1991, its forces performed well on 
numerous occasions.  After the cease-fire of January 1992, Croatian President 
Tudjman made very public work of building up Croatia’s armed forces in 
anticipation of future conflicts.
Bosnia made this same transition somewhat later.  Despite urging from 
numerous advisers, President Alija Izetbegović resisted large-scale buildup 
of military forces while talks for the preservation of Bosnia were still going 
on.  The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina (ABiH) was not 
formally established until the summer of 1992, so the early battles of the war 
in Bosnia were all fought by territorial forces which generally were greatly 
inferior to the JNA in manpower, weaponry, and training.  Since the import 
of almost all arms had to take place through Croatian territory, Bosnia was 
largely dependent on Croatia for the acquisition of heavy weapons.  Since 
both were subject to the poorly-enforced arms embargo voted by the United 
Nations Security Council in September 1991, both the rearmament program 
in Croatia and that in Bosnia were accomplished with great difficulty and in 
defiance of the Security Council resolution.
The International Community’s Involvement and Proposals
When war began in Slovenia in June 1991, the European Community 
(renamed the European Union in January 1994) dispatched its “Troika” lead-
ers to negotiate an end to the conflict.  As noted above, the JNA decided not 
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to contest Slovenian independence any further, so it appeared that this EC 
mediation had been successful.  But hopes for an easy repetition in Croatia 
were soon dashed.  The Secretary General of the United Nations appointed 
Cyrus Vance as his Personal Representative.  A former U.S. Secretary of State 
highly regarded for his mediation skills, Vance attempted to negotiate many 
cease-fires during the Croatian war.  None of them lasted very long, until 
the JNA and Croatia reached agreement on January 1, 1992, to consent to 
the dispatch of U.N peacekeepers to separate their forces.  This agreement 
was signed in Sarajevo the next day.  UN peacekeepers were subsequently 
dispatched to Croatia to monitor the accord under the title of UNPROFOR, 
the United Nations Protection Force.  Its headquarters, with some irony, was 
established in Sarajevo.
As tensions rose in Bosnia and led to war, the international community 
became progressively more involved in the quest for an end to the conflict. 
A series of five major plans were proposed by international negotiators to 
resolve the crisis.  These were the following:
1. The European Community mediation, or Lisbon Agreement, of 
February 1992;
2.  Vance-Owen Peace Plan of January 1993.
3.  The Owen-Stoltenberg proposals, from June 1993 to early 1994.
4.  The Washington Agreements of February 1994; and
5.  The Dayton Peace Agreement, reached in November 1995 and signed 
in Paris in December 1995.
Only the first three of these pertain to the period under examination in this 
proceeding.
In February 1992 the European Community summoned the Serbian, 
Croatian and Bosniak leaders to Lisbon for talks to conclude an agreement 
in hopes of avoiding hostilities.  Alija Izetbegović represented the govern-
ment of the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina; Mate Boban represented the 
Bosnian Croats; and Radovan Karadžić represented the Bosnian Serbs.  The 
latter two reached an agreement on a plan for cantonization of Bosnia, one 
that would create ethnically dominant enclaves but leave some power in the 
hands of the central government.  Under pressure from the EU to reach an 
agreement, President Izetbegović also agreed, much to the surprise of many 
members of his own party and some international officials.  His adherence to 
the agreement was at variance with his own prior statements on the impor-
tance of retaining an integral Bosnia and Hercegovina within its preexisting 
boundaries.  
Izetbegović renounced the Lisbon Agreement almost as soon as he returned 
to Sarajevo.  Further talks were held in the next two months in Sarajevo, but 
no proposal won the support of all three sides.  The independence referendum 
(February 29 and March 1, 1992) and the subsequent recognition of Bosnia’s 
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independence by the European Community and the U.S. were soon followed 
by full-scale war in the city of Sarajevo on May 2-3 and in Tuzla on May 15. 
Cease-fires were regularly concluded, usually with international mediation, 
and were just as quickly broken as the Serbian coalition conquered much of 
the Bosnian countryside and laid siege to several cities.
In August 1992, the London Conference was convened to establish the 
basis for a permanent and definitive peace.  Its final statement endorsed an 
end to the war, a return of all refugees to their homes, the reversal of ethnic 
cleansing and unimpeded delivery of humanitarian aid to those in need.  It 
authorized the appointment of co-chairmen of the Steering Committee 
of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, as the London 
Conference came to be called.  The first co-chairmen were Lord David Owen, 
representing the European Community, and Cyrus Vance, as the Personal 
Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations.
Vance and Owen immediately began working on a peace plan, but they 
experienced little success in gaining agreement of the parties to any single 
proposal.  These initial discussions were held in confidentiality. Then, on 
January 2, 1993, they hosted the first formal plenary session and simultane-
ously released their proposal to the public.  The essence of the plan was the 
creation of ten provinces, with one of the three parties assigned a dominant 
role in all but the central province around Sarajevo, where power was to be 
shared by all three groups.  Lord Owens’ version of this map is attached as 
Map Thirteen.  In addition to a map, the proposed peace plan consisted of 
constitutional provisions for a relatively weak central government, a cease-fire 
agreement, and interim provisions for the transition to a demilitarized Bosnia 
and Hercegovina.  
As it turned out, the Vance-Owen Plan of January 1993 was the high water 
mark of Croatian national fortunes in Bosnia from a territorial standpoint. 
Provinces 3, 8, and 10 were assigned to the Bosnian Croats.   On the first avail-
able occasion, on January 4, 1993, Mate Boban agreed to all four provisions on 
behalf of the Bosnian Croats.  Alija Izetbegović declined to agree to the map. 
Radovan Karadžić, acting on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs, rejected the map 
and certain constitutional provisions.
A period of intense diplomatic activity followed, the aim of which was to 
convince Alija Izetbegović to agree to the document so that pressure could 
then be turned on the Bosnian Serbs.  Negotiations were held in Geneva and 
then in New York.  Under enormous international pressure, Izetbegović agreed 
to the plan in its entirety in New York on March 25, 1993.  He did so with 
great reservation, expressed in an annex to a report to the Secretary General 
of the United Nations.  His reservations pertained to the lack of assurances 
to undo the results of ethnic cleansing and conquest, by which he meant the 
military victories of the Bosnian Serbs.  The plan called for the Bosnian Serbs 
to withdraw from several areas under their military control, but it nonetheless 
rewarded them, as seen on the map, with substantial portions of Bosnia from 
which they had expelled or killed much of the Muslim population. 
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In the meantime, the Bosnian Serb Army was stepping up its attacks on the 
ground.  They launched new attacks in eastern Bosnia, tightened their siege 
of the city of Srebrenica, and intensified shelling on Sarajevo, and impeded 
the delivery of aid by humanitarian convoys.  They pressured international 
organizations such as the UNHCR to exchange civilians, forcing those organi-
zations to choose between saving civilian lives and facilitating Serbian ethnic 
cleansing.  It is difficult to return to the reports of these activities without con-
cluding that this was more than maneuvering for advantage, and indeed more 
than defiance.  These activities of the Bosnian Serbs were a form of taunting, 
intended to deliberately draw attention to the impotence of the international 
community and highlight their own intention to act with impunity.  This 
strategy kept the Srebrenica and Sarajevo sieges as lead headlines in many 
international media for many weeks in March and early April of 1993.
On April 2, 1993, a Bosnian Serb representative assembly meeting at Bileca 
voted to reject the Owen-Vance Plan.  The vote came after Serbian President 
Milošević and others friendly to the Bosnian Serbs had urged them to approve 
the plan.  The vote was deeply disappointing to the international negotia-
tors.  The same assembly rejected the plan a second time in early May, and 
a referendum provided a final, decisive rejection of the Vance-Owen Plan by 
the Bosnian Serbs.  Their intransigence proved to be beneficial.  International 
negotiators revised the map and proposed to award them more territory. 
Those gains came partly at the expense of the Bosnian Croats. 
Cyrus Vance stepped down as the Personal Representative of the UN 
Secretary General and was replaced by Thorvald Stoltenberg on May 1, 1993. 
While the negotiators proceeded much as before, the plan in Map Fifteen is 
more accurately designated as an Owen-Stoltenberg Plan.  Comparing this to 
the earlier plan, one sees that the territory proposed for the Bosnian Croats 
has been reduced in two ways.  First, Bosnian Croat holdings in the Posavina 
were substantially reduced.  Second, Bosnian Croat holdings in western 
Hercegovina and Central Bosnia were reduced, with a narrow protrusion 
of Bosnian government land from the south into the Zenica area. The first 
plan, Vance-Owen, gave land to the Croats in Province 10, following borders 
that are discernibly similar to the boundaries from the Cvetković-Maček 
Agreement of 1939.  Their territory in the Owen-Vance Plan extended to 
the town of Busovača in the Lašva Valley.  The Owen-Stoltenberg proposal 
reduced those gains.  Thus the Owen-Vance Plan, although never accepted 
by the Bosnian Serbs, was the high water mark of Bosnian Croat fortunes in 
terms of territory on the negotiators’ draft map.
The Transformation of Croatian Institutions 
From November 1991 through February 1992, Bosnian Croat political 
institutions underwent a transformation.  This occurred in several differ-
ent steps, to be addressed below.  Fundamentally, these institutions moved 
from representing all Bosnian Croats and supporting a territorially unified 
Bosnia, to supporting a territorially distinct Bosnian Croat “community” that 
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asserted its separation from the central government of Bosnia and assigned to 
itself many of the attributes of sovereignty.  Under the name of the Croatian 
Community of Herceg-Bosna (HZ H-B), this territorial unit included about 
70% of Bosnia’s Croat population.  Its leaders came to function as an exten-
sion of the aims of President Tudjman and the Republic of Croatia.
Franjo Tudjman frequently and consistently expressed his views regarding 
Croatia’s interest in Bosnia.  It was often the first impression that he left with 
those who got to know him.  Lord David Owen, who got to know him well in 
1992 and 1993 while pursuing peace talks, made the following observation in 
his book:
 Tudjman’s nationalism is worn openly on his sleeve.  He has one pur-
pose in life: to control all the territory that he believes historically 
belongs to Croatia.  To that end he will use any means.  He will do it 
with a smile a quizzical look, or a fit of rage, indications of the seething 
activity that drives him on.2  
Lord Owen also reports that Tudjman spoke openly on behalf of the 
Bosnian Croats:  
 As the search for more territory for the Muslims gathered momen-
tum, the Croatian government once again, and without any attempt to 
pretend that they did not set policy for the Bosnian Croats, stated to 
all the EU Ambassadors in Zagreb that there had to be 17.5% for any 
predominantly Croatian republic and in no circumstances could Vitez 
and Busovača be given up. … Their formal position was set out in a let-
ter to us from President Tudjman on 20th December 1993.3  
Warren Zimmerman, the U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia at the time of the 
1990 elections in Croatia, met with President Tudjman for the first time over 
breakfast the day after his victory.  He later wrote of that occasion,
 Unlike Milošević, who was driven by power, Tudjman betrayed an 
obsession with creating nationalism.  His devotion to Croatia was of 
the most narrow-minded sort. …  He stated flatly and with no evi-
dence, ‘Bosnia has historically been a part of Croatia and has always 
been in Croatia’s geo-political sphere.  Not only do Croats live in 
Bosnia but most Muslims in Bosnia consider themselves Croats.’4
These views may be found in the writings of the historian Franjo Tudjman 
two decades ago.  His book Nationalism and Contemporary Europe was 
published in English in the East European Monographs series of Columbia 
University Press in 1981.  Relevant pages are attached as Appendix Three. 




4 Warren ZIMMERMAN, Origins of a Catastrophe, 74.-75.
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Large parts of Croatia had been incorporated into Bosnia by the Turks. 
Furthermore, Bosnia and Hercegovina were historically linked with Croatia 
and they together comprise an indivisible, geographic and economic entity. 
Bosnia and Hercegovina occupy the central part of this whole, separating 
southern (Dalmatian) from northern (Pannonian) Croatia.  The creation 
of a separate Bosnia and Herzegovina makes the territorial and geographic 
position of Croatia extremely unnatural in the economic sense and therefore 
in the broadest national political sense very unfavorable for life and develop-
ment and in the narrow administrative sense unsuitable and disadvantageous. 
These factors largely explain why the 1939 agreement between Belgrade and 
Zagreb included the following areas of Bosnia into the Banovina of Croatia: 
the whole of Hercegovina and Mostar and those Bosnian districts where the 
Croats have a clear majority (Bugojno, Fojnica, Travnik, Derventa, Gradačac, 
Brčko).5
Tudjman argued that Bosnia should be part of Croatia based on Croatia’s 
economic and geopolitical interests and on the ethnic composition of west-
ern Hercegovina and central Bosnia.  As noted earlier, the area of western 
Hercegovina, to the west of Mostar, is one of the few areas of Bosnia and 
Hercegovina that has a single dominant nationality, so there is ample evidence 
to back his assertion of a Croatian majority there.   As for the areas of central 
Bosnia, a look at the 1991 census shows the following percentage of Croats in 
these districts:







Similar numbers may be shown for other municipalities in central Bosnia, 






If Croats reach no more than 40.9% of the population in these areas only ten 
years after Tudjman published the book, he could only conclude that each of 
the central Bosnian areas has a “clear Croat majority” if he assumed that the 
5 Franjo TUĐMAN, Nationalism and Contemporary Europe, 1981, 113.
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Muslim population was largely Croat as well.  Thus he adopted the Croatian 
nationalist conviction that Muslims were really Croats.  He wrote,
An objective examination of the numerical composition of the population 
of Bosnia and Hercegovina cannot ignore that the majority of the Muslims is 
in its ethnic character and speech incontrovertibly of Croatian origin.  Despite 
religious and cultural distinctions created by history, the vast majority of the 
Muslims declared themselves Croats when the opportunity arose.  This was 
done in 1920 by the Muslim representatives in the Constituent Assembly. … 
It was done by the Muslim intelligentsia and masses during the Banovina 
Hrvatska [1939-41, the time of the Cvetković-Maček Agreement – rjd] and 
the independent state of Croatia [i.e., World War II, 1941-45 – rjd] which all 
Muslims and Catholics of Bosnia-Hercegovina at first accepted as their own. 
… On the basis of these facts we arrive at the conclusion that a majority of the 
population of Bosnia and Hercegovina is Croatian. (p. 114)
Tudjman’s insistence on the Croatian nature of the Bosnian Muslims, or 
Bosniacs, has been unrelenting and contrary to a mounting body of evidence. 
During the socialist period, Bosnia’s Muslims at first were denied the oppor-
tunity to declare themselves as Muslims, but in every census had the oppor-
tunity to declare themselves as Croats.  The 1948 census allowed respondents 
to declare themselves Muslim by religion, but they had to choose between 
Serbian and Croatian by nationality.  Some 890,094 residents of Bosnia 
declared themselves Muslim by religion.  Of those, only 24, 918, or about 
3%, opted for Croatian national identity.  In the next census, that of 1953, the 
national category of “Yugoslav” was added, and it became something of a sur-
rogate identity for the Bosnian Muslim.  891,800 residents of Bosnia chose 
“Yugoslav” over either Croat or Serb.  In 1961, it became possible for the first 
time for Bosnians to declare themselves as “Muslim in the ethnic sense,” and 
in 1971 they could declare themselves Muslim by nationality.  These numbers 
rose consistently from 1961 to 1991, as shown below.
Muslims and Croats in Bosnia and Hercegovina, 1961-1991
Census Year  Muslims  Croats




As can be seen, the number of Croats changed little according to the last 
three censuses before the war. 
 As President of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman had many opportunities to try 
to implement his theories about Bosnia.  In March 1991, talks were taking 
place between the Presidents of all the Yugoslav Republics.  Toward the end of 
these discussions, a meeting was held at Karadjordjevo near Belgrade between 
6 Ibid, 114.
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President Tudjman of Croatia and President Milošević of Serbia.  On March 2, 
1991, they reportedly met alone behind closed doors.  Immediately thereafter 
various media reported that they had discussed or reached an agreement on 
the partition of Bosnia between Serbia and Croatia.  Subsequent public state-
ments by persons close to those talks suggest that there was some discussion 
and probably an agreement in principle but no definitive agreement on a map. 
In the aftermath of the meeting, the term “Karadjordjevo” entered the political 
lexicon of the region as a synonym for the division of Bosnia between Croatia 
and Serbia.
The Bosnian Croat voters supported a different approach in the elections 
of November 1990.  They voted in large numbers for the Croatian Democratic 
Union of Bosnia and Hercegovina (HDZ-BiH), headed by Stjepan Kljuić.  He 
supported the realization of Croat political aspirations within an integral and 
sovereign Bosnia that provided equality to all its constituent nations.  Kljuić 
became a member of the Bosnian Presidency in December 1990. 
In November 1991, two meetings took place to move the HDZ-BiH away 
from support for an integral Bosnia and toward support for territorial separa-
tism for Bosnia’s Croats.  The first of these, on November 12, established the 
Croatian Community of the Bosnian Posavina.  The November 18th meeting 
declared the formation of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosnia (HZ 
H-B) as the “political, cultural, economic, and territorial union” of the Croats 
of Bosnia and Hercegovina.  It was announced the next day as a “concrete 
response to the formation of Serbian autonomous regions.”  Mate Boban was 
selected the head of the HZ H-B.   Dario Kordić and Božo Rajić were selected 
as its two Vice Presidents.
Stjepan Kljuić announced the creation of these Croatian “communities 
of municipalities” (the word “opcina” is translated as either “commune” or 
“municipality) with a distinct lack of enthusiasm, and he affirmed the inten-
tion of the Croats of Bosnia to support a sovereign and integral Bosnian state. 
The Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna was “not yet in the phase of being 
realized,” he stated.  “It is a sign of belonging to Bosnia and Hercegovina in 
the framework of its sovereignty.  We will abide by all decisions made by the 
Assembly and the Presidency of Bosnia and Hercegovina.”7 
Mate Boban, President of the Community of Herceg-Bosna, viewed the HZ 
H-B very differently.  He stated that the Community restored the territory 
made part of Croatia in the 1939 Cvetković-Maček Agreement and forebod-
ingly stated that the Croatian community’s support for the central Bosnian 
government was highly conditional. “The Croatian Community of Herceg-
Bosna represents a geopolitical, cultural, and economic whole and proceeds 
from the former Banovina, in whose borders the Croatian people awaited 
World War II,” he said. “As long as the government of Bosnia and Hercegovina 
exists as legal, legitimate, and democratic, our Community will fully respect 
7 Oslobođenje (Sarajevo), 20 November 1991, 3.
8 Ibid.
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this Republic, but if its authority is curtailed or ceases to exist, there is for us no 
other alternative.”8 This statement, of course, placed him squarely in the camp 
of President Tudjman in longing for the old Banovina borders of 1939-41.  He 
used words similar to those of President Tudjman in his 1981 book, in which 
Tudjman described Bosnia and Croatia as an “indivisible geographic and eco-
nomic entity.”
 The self-proclaimed Communities of Herceg-Bosna and the Posavina 
included 526,101 Croats, out of 1,187,078 total inhabitants of these territories. 
(Two minor variances should be noted in these numbers.  Only parts of the 
Trebinje District and Skender Vakuf were incorporated into Herceg-Bosna, 
and the census returns from 1991 do not provide for following those dividing 
lines.  Therefore I have omitted them from the analysis.) Thus the population 
of the self-proclaimed Communities was about 44% Croat.  The 1991 census 
recorded a total of 755,895 Croats in all of the Republic.  So over 200,000 
Bosnian Croats lived outside the Croatian Communities of Herceg-Bosna and 
the Posavina at the time they were proclaimed.
With Kljuić supporting Croat loyalty to a sovereign Bosnia, Tudjman decid-
ed that Kljuić had to go.  In February 1992 he dispatched Stipe Mesić, a former 
member of the Presidency of Yugoslavia, to Bosnia to deliver the message that 
Kljuić needed to resign.  At a closed-door meeting in Široki Brijeg on February 
2, Mesić informed Kljuić of Tudjman’s wishes.  Kljuić walked out of the ses-
sion.  Upon encountering reporters waiting outside, he declined to provide a 
reason for his departure and departed promptly for Sarajevo.
Although Stjepan Kljuić subsequently resigned as head of the HDZ-BiH, he 
continued as an active member of the Presidency of Bosnia.  The Presidency 
members named him as the President of the State Commission on War 
Crimes created in April 1992, and in June 1992, on behalf of the Presidency, 
Kljuić ordered that all reservists of the Ministry of Internal Affairs be placed 
under the General Command of the armed forces of Bosnia.  He resigned in 
the fall of 1992 for personal reasons, then rejoined the Presidency in October 
1993.  He remained in Sarajevo through the siege and war.
Kljuić’s departure led subsequently to the selection of Milenko Brkić as 
head of the HDZ-BiH.  Brkić also supported an integral Bosnia and Croat loy-
alty to it.  In November 1992, Mate Boban was selected to replace Brkić as head 
of the HDZ-BiH.  Thus the leadership of the “Community of Herceg-Bosna” 
and the HDZ-BiH was fused in a single person, known to be a loyal follower 
of President Tudjman and an advocate of territorial separatism for Bosnia’s 
Croats.  
On February 9, 1992, a second session of the HDZ-BiH was convened.  At 
this meeting, HDZ-BiH passed two resolutions that moved toward a separate 
Croatian community in Bosnia.  The first of these provided that all residents 
of the territory of Herceg-Bosna would also be citizens of Croatia, permitting 
them to vote in elections of the Croatian Republic.  This idea was promoted by 
President Tudjman, and the Republic of Croatia enacted legislation that gave 
Croats the right to vote in Croatian elections even if they lived outside the 
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Republic.  Dual citizenship could potentially strengthen the loyalty of Croats 
outside Croatia to the Republic, and they were considered to be likely to vote 
for the Croatian HDZ.  
The second resolution was a proposed change in the wording of the ref-
erendum on Bosnia’s independence, scheduled for a vote only three weeks 
later.  The resolution proposed an amendment incorporating a reference to 
national areas, that is cantons, of the Serbs, Croats and Muslims.  After four 
hours of discussion, this resolution passed with three opposing votes.  Since 
the referendum was being held at the behest of the European Community as 
a condition of considering Bosnia’s recognition as a sovereign state, this pro-
posed change seemed to be an effort to derail the move toward Bosnia’s inde-
pendence and recognition.  It subsequently had no effect on the referendum. 
But the incorporation of a reference to national areas was another step in the 
HDZ-BiH’s transformation from representing the community of all Croats to 
being a territorially based party representing the Croats of the HZ H-B.
On September 14, 1992, Constitutional Court of the Republic of Bosnia 
and Hercegovina ruled that the proclamation of the Croatian Community 
of Herceg-Bosna (HZ H-B) was unconstitutional.  The court also suspended 
several declarations of the Presidency of the HZ H-B from July 1992 in which 
it had asserted authority over various military, administrative, and govern-
mental matters that were constitutionally designated as within the jurisdic-
tion of the government of the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina.   The 
Court’s decision reported that it had reviewed these proclamations and deci-
sions on its own initiative and that the decision had been under consideration 
since July 1992.  
Although the leaders of the HDZ-BiH and the HZ H-B had proclaimed 
their loyalty to Bosnia and Hercegovina, they were undeterred by this court 
decision.  Only a month after the ruling, they further consolidated their gov-
ernmental, military, and political authority in the territory of the HZ H-B. 
The Second General Assembly of the HDZ-BiH, held on November 14, 1992, 
voted to fuse all activities of the party (HDZ-BiH), the government (HZ H-B) 
and the military (HVO) under the leadership of Mate Boban.  It became com-
mon after this meeting for the fused institutions, often under the name of the 
HVO or HVO Council, to speak for the Bosnian Croats and for the Croatian 
Community of Herceg-Bosna on political as well as military matters. 
Convergence 
In the spring of 1993, all of these developments came together.  In response, 
the HDZ-BiH leadership took drastic steps to seize power in the region of 
Hercegovina and central Bosnia and issued a dire threat to those who might 
stand in its way.
First, the entire region was profoundly affected by the advances of the 
Greater Serbian coalition.  By November 1991, the JNA victories in Croatia 
had left that government in need of allies and in search of a strategy for 
R.J.DONIA, Statement of Expert Witness                                                                                     God. 36., br. 1., 107.-141. (2004) 
138 139
recovery.   The threat of further Serbian advances in Croatia receded after the 
cease-fire of January 1992.  Within a few months, however, Serb expansion 
shifted to Bosnia.  The JNA forces in Bosnia were reconstituted as the Bosnian 
Serb Army and quickly conquered much of the country.  By the spring of 1993 
the Bosnian Government and its army (ABiH) were under great pressure, and 
many of its primary cities were under siege.  The BSA had riveted world atten-
tion on the siege of Srebrenica and emphasized the irresolution or impotence 
of the international community in Bosnia. 
The second key development was the search for an end to hostilities 
embodied in the Owen-Vance and Owen-Stoltenberg peace proposals.  As 
noted above, the first public proposal was received eagerly by the transformed 
HDZ-BiH and signed with alacrity by Mate Boban on their behalf in early 
January 1993.  It designated as Croatian most areas that had been part of 
the Croatian Banovina from 1939 to 1941.  From the first map presented by 
Vance and Owen, it was a gradual downhill slide in terms of territorial alloca-
tion.  Bosnian Serb advances, although modest in territorial terms in the first 
months of 1993, nonetheless dampened Bosnian Croat hopes for a territorial 
designation as favorable as they had agreed to in January.   In the spring of 
1993, the prospects for securing a sizeable Herceg-Bosna were slowly slipping 
away.
In New York, a recalcitrant Alija Izetbegović signed the Vance-Owen Plan 
in mid-March 1993 after enormous pressure from the international com-
munity.  Soon he began to back-peddle, something he had already done after 
the Lisbon Agreement.  At a press conference on March 28, 1993 in Zagreb, 
he stated that he would withdraw his signature from the Vance-Owen Plan if 
the international community could not force an end to the Serbian offensive 
in eastern Bosnia.  He also declared that he had met with President Tudjman 
the day before and discussed the growing tension between the HVO and the 
ABiH in central Bosnia.  He announced that they had agreed to create a com-
mon command to end those hostilities.
On April 2, 1993, the Bosnian Serb assembly meeting at Bileca rejected the 
Owen-Vance plan for the first time, raising the prospect that it would need to 
be revised to secure Serbian acquiescence.  The next day, on April 3, 1993, the 
HVO convened a meeting in Mostar similar to other gatherings of Bosnian 
Croat leaders loyal to President Tudjman’s ideals.  These were reported in the 
Zagreb newspaper Vjesnik, dated April 4, 1993, and in Slobodna Dalmacija 
of the same date. Both articles may be considered authoritative, as Vjesnik is 
a semi-official newspaper that generally reflects the Tudjman government’s 
approach.  The author of the Slobodna Dalmacija article, was also the spokes-
man for the HVO in Bosnia.  He thus was in a position to publish his own 
press release.
At first glance these nearly identical stories appear to be press releases 
accompanied by the text of an agreement.  On closer inspection, they turn 
out to be an ominous threat issued under cover of the proposed Vance-Owen 
peace plan.  It included a deadline within which the Bosnian government was 
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told to comply with the demands.   This meant expelling the officials, police, 
and army of the internationally recognized government of Bosnia from 
Provinces 3, 8, and 10 of the peace plan draft.  
The draft agreement is the centerpiece of this threat.   Article 1 refers to 
the Owen-Vance plan:  “All misunderstandings have been avoided between 
the Croatian and Muslim people concerning the borders of the provinc-
es…”  Article 2 states that “all armed forces of the HVO and the police of 
the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosnia, as well as of the HVO army, 
the Bosnia-Herzegovina army and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Ministry of the 
Interior, known as MUP, which originate outside their provinces shall have to 
identify themselves and leave such provinces within three days.”  This would 
mean that all Bosnian forces would have to evacuate Provinces 3, 8, and 10, 
where they had a substantial presence.
Article 3 provides for the separation of military forces.
Until the complete demilitarization of Bosnia-Herzegovina as envis-
aged under the peace plan and for reasons of more efficient defense against 
aggression, the domicile armed forces of HVO and the BH army in provinces 
1, 5, and 9 shall be placed on the command of the main staff of the Bosnia-
Herzegovina army and in provinces 3, 8 and 10 under the command of the 
main staff of the HVO. 
It should be noted that many individual Croats, and certain Croatian units, 
had long served under the command of the ABiH.  The notion that ABiH 
troops would serve under HVO command, however, was a departure from 
current practices.  
Article 4 provided for the joint command, agreed upon in Zagreb a few 
days earlier, “no later than 15 April 1993.”  
The accompanying news article specified the consequences if the Bosnian 
government fails to sign the agreement. 
In the event that the statement is not signed by the heads of the Muslim 
delegation in provinces 3, 8, and 10, the Croatian Defense Council (HVO) of 
the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosnia has decided to apply the
provisions of the peace plan whereby each national armed force shall retreat 
to their domicile provinces… If the joint statement is not implemented, the 
competent military and other bodies of the Croatian Defense Council of the 
Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna shall implement the said item of the 
basic document in the territories of Provinces 3, 8, and 10.
In other words, the HVO would unilaterally implement Owen-Vance by 
expelling the ABiH from the territory of those provinces.   This threatened 
coup within these three provinces is followed by an explicit warning that 
no officials of the Bosnian government will be recognized:  “The Croatian 
Defense Council (HVO) of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna shall 
prevent any attempt to establish various bodies appointed by the present uni-
lateral Presidency.”   
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Other press reports in subsequent days recognized this somewhat compli-
cated pronouncement as a threat of imminent action. Mark Heinrich, Reuters 
correspondent, filed a report from Zagreb on April 4 highlighting the ultima-
tum.
Bosnia’s Croat militia command (HVO) threw an extra spanner into the 
peace works when, in an ultimatum-like statement carried by Croatian state 
media, it called on Moslem army and police units to vacate regions earmarked 
for Croat government.  … ‘If Izetbegović fails to sign this agreement by April 
15, the HVO will unilaterally enforce its jurisdiction in cantons three, eight, 
and 10,’ the statement from HVO headquarters in the southwest Croat strong-
hold of Mostar warned. … Moslems constitute large minorities or even local-
ized majorities in No. 8 and 10 provinces.  
Agence France Press used the following words:  “Bosnian Croat leader 
Mate Boban has called for the Muslim-led Bosnian army to pull out of three 
Bosnian provinces which are considered Croatian.  In his appeal to President 
Alija Izetbegović released in Zagreb yesterday, Boban called for the immedi-
ate implementation of the Vance-Owen plan and threatened to use force if 
his demands are not met.”  A report from the Serbian news service, Tanjug in 
English, similarly characterized the HDZ as an ultimatum. 
The April 3 HVO meeting raised the stakes in the Muslim-Croat tension 
in central Bosnia and in Hercegovina.  It transformed local skirmishes over 
sovereignty into a unified, consistent policy.  That policy, of taking full mili-
tary and administrative control over Provinces 3, 8, and 10, was to be enforced 
after April 15, 1993, by the HVO and the “fused” leadership of the Croatian 
Community of Herceg-Bosna and the HDZ-BiH.
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